Persuasion and Norm Persistence

Presented: Rethinking Economic Theory International Workshop, Athens, GR; Brown Bag Seminar, St Andrews, UK; GAMES 2024, Beijing, CN; RES Annual Conference 2024, Belfast, UK; PhD Presentation and Networking, The Alan Turing Institute, London, UK; 2024 SGPE Conference, Crieff, UK.

Abstract

I study a dynamic information design problem à la Albano and Lizzeri (2001) in which a regulator can disclose unobserved quality information as the norms of a population evolve. Under moral hazard, the regulator sets a pass/fail standard ex-ante. A monopolist chooses a price to sell an asset to a population of consumers. Over time, consumers’ purchase decision depends on the signal, others’ buying behaviour, and norm evolution. In this paper, I use evolutionary game theory to describe the tension between quality certification and norm persistence.

Draft coming soon.